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Case Comment

LaRUE v. LaRUE:
EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL ASSETS
FINALLY AVAILABLE IN WEST VIRGINIA
I.

INTRODUCTION

More than a century has passed since the acclaimed Married Women's
Property Acts' emancipated West Virginia women from financial bondage to
their husbands. Yet so often, in these more enlightened times when the
cultural trend is toward creating marriages based upon cooperative financial
planning, the husband maintains the bank accounts, holds title to real estate
and the family cars, maintains a life insurance policy, accumulates future
retirement and Social Security benefits in his name, owns stock and perhaps
his own business. While this kind of traditional financial management may be
satisfactory for the healthy marriage, it places the wife in serious jeopardy
when the marriage deteriorates toward divorce.2 During the marriage, the
wife may have been a comforting, supporting companion, diligent homemaker
and mother, helped the husband's business, and perhaps earned an income of
her own, all the while proceeding on the assumption that labor and frugality
would secure the future. But, until recently, whenever divorce intervened
and the family wealth was titled in the husband, the wife's marriage-long
labors and sacrifices often resulted in a bleak, disappointing future.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has recognized that
although the Married Women's Property Acts were to be the spark for injecting financial equality into the institution of marriage, stubborn traditional
property notions have smothered any attempts to extend financial equality at
the divorce court's steps. The court, in recent years, has begun to redefine
the circuit courts' equitable powers in divorce actions to enable them to
distribute marital property more equitably to prevent one party from being
unjustly enriched. Its most recent decision in this regard, LaRue v. LaRue,3
was a bold movement toward allowing a divorced spouse to recoup his or her
' Now embodied in W. VA. CODE §§ 48-3-1 to 25 (1980), the Married Women's Property Acts
theoretically give men and women equal rights to acquire, own and control real property.
2 Throughout this comment, the wife will generally be characterized as the disadvantaged
party primarily because that is a more accurate representation of the real social situation and
because that was the situation in the present case. However, for the most part, the West Virginia
divorce laws put men and women on equal par. Thus, a husband may receive alimony from a wife,
W. VA. CODE §§ 48-2-15 and 48-2-16 (1980); See also Murredu v. Murredu, 236 S.E.2d 452 (W. Va.
1977); and either spouse's property can be transferred to the more deserving spouse under the
equitable distribution formula of LaRue v. LaRue, 304 S.E.2d 312 (W. Va. 1983).
304 S.E.2d 312 (W. Va. 1983).
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share of the marital property. The court ruled that where one spouse has
made a material economic contribution to the marital property, upon divorce,
the circuit courts have the equitable powers to award that spouse an
equitable share, regardless of who is at fault for the divorce, and regardless
of the fact that the property to be shared may be titled in the other spouse.4
Furthermore, the court, with some limitations, extended the right to claim
equitable distribution of marital property where the claiming spouse's only
contribution was that of performing homemaking services.' This holding
represents a radical departure from the state's long-held belief in the inviolability of title and indicates that West Virginia is moving along, with the
majority of other jurisdictions, toward recognizing marriage as an economic
partnership rather than as status-based roles.'
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Mr. and Mrs. LaRue had been married for thirty years. Except for seven
years early in the marriage, Mrs. LaRue's occupation had been that of a
homemaker and mother, having raised two children into adulthood. Mr.
LaRue was an accountant earning $43,000.00 a year at the time of divorce. He
had encouraged Mrs. LaRue to be a housewife and homemaker and to entertain his business associates. Early in the marriage the LaRues had sold a
jointly-owned home and, with the proceeds, purchased another home, with
the title in Mrs. LaRue's name. In 1972, when the marriage was faltering, Mr.
LaRue had his wife sign a deed transferring the title to his name only. Mr.
LaRue did not record the deed until 1979, after the parties had separated.
Just before the divorce action was filed, Mr. LaRue withdrew funds from
jointly-held bank accounts.
In the divorce action, the Ohio County Circuit Court found inequitable
conduct on both sides but concluded that Mr. LaRue's abusive conduct far
outweighed that of his wife. Mrs. LaRue unsuccessfully petitioned for a onehalf interest in all real and personal property owned by Mr. LaRue. In accor-,
dance with its limited equitable powers, the court awarded Mrs. LaRue only
$240.00 per month as alimony, an allowance for health insurance, a car, and
some personal property.' Mr. LaRue retained his car, the family home, the

Id at 320. This authority is found in W. VA. CODE § 48-2-21 (1980), which states:
Upon decreeing the annulment of a marriage, or upon decreeing a divorce, the
court shall have power to award to either of the parties whatever of his or her property,
real or personal, may be in the possession, or under the control, or in the name, of the
other, and to compel a transfer or conveyance thereof as in other cases of chancery.
While the language of this section has been in effect and unchanged since 1931, it has only now
been interpreted to permit equitable distribution. See infra text accompanying note 47.
' 304 S.E.2d at 322.
' See Note, The Distributionof MaritalReal Property Upon Divorce in West Virginia: The

Need for Legislative Reform, 82 W. VA. L. REV. 611, 613-14 (1980).
' This was later raised to $450.00. 304 S.E.2d at 329.
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"lion's share of the household goods," $27,000.00 in bank accounts, corporate
stock worth $2,100.00, his partnership in his accounting firm and control of
nine life insurance policies which had been changed to remove Mrs. LaRue as
beneficiary.8
On appeal, Mrs. LaRue's plight, indicative of that of many others, led the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals to empower the circuit courts with
greater equitable authority to distribute the marital assets more justly. The
court held that a circuit court may transfer title to both real and personal
property to satisfy an award for equitable distribution and that such an interest falls within the purview of West Virginia Code section 48-2-21.1
The court extended this authority by allowing equitable distribution to a
spouse whose only contribution to the marital property was that of providing
homemaking services."0 In other words, a spouse is entitled to claim a share
of the property even if he or she had made no material economic contribution
to the marriage. However, the court refused to view homemaking contributions as a property interest and instead considered an award on this basis to
be more akin to an alimony right. Whereas a spouse may be entitled to
equitable distribution for having made a material economic contribution to
the marital assets even if he or she is at fault for the divorce, such a right is
more tenuous for the faulty party whose only contribution was that of
homemaking services.
The court also placed another limitation on recovery rights based on
homemaking services. It interpreted section 48-2-21 as authority to transfer
title to property from one spouse to the other only where the untitled party
has made a material economic contribution toward acquiring the property."
Therefore, since homemaking services are considered the quid pro quo for
financial support from the other spouse, those services are not, according to
the court, an additional economic contribution toward the property. 2 The
court did say, however, that where section 48-2-21 does not permit transfer of
title based on homemaking services, the circuit courts could grant a lumpsum monetary award to satisfy the equitable distribution claim."
In LaRue, the court also ruled on some related procedural matters. First,
the court held that a claim for equitable distribution must be specifically
asserted in the divorce action in order to be considered by the court. 4 Sec-

§ 48-2-21 (1980).
304 S.E.2d at 322. (Overruling that part of Patterson v. Patterson, 277 S.E.2d 709 (W.Va.

W. VA. CODE

1981), which absolutely forbade consideration of homemaking service in the equitable distribution

of marital assets under a constructive trust theory).
304 S.E.2d at 321 (W.Va. 1983).
Id at 322.
, Id. at 323.
"1Id.
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ond, equitable distribution claims were permitted to be settled by property
settlement agreements."5 Finally, equitable distribution based on economic
contribution was made available to other pending cases where the issue had
been specifically asserted, but equitable distribution claims based on
homemaking services were allowed only prospectively and only to those
cases already on appeal to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals as of
May 25, 1983, the date of the LaRue decision."6
In his concurring opinion, Justice Neely expressed his concern for the
plight of divorced women and his recognition of the insufficiency of alimony
to rectify the plight. 7 He casts some light on the problems of distributing
future interests 8 disputes the finding that fault can be considered in claims
based on homemaking services 9 and suggests that equitable distribution can
now cure the problem of unjust enrichment. He concludes, therefore, that the
recently expanded alimony powers which were fashioned to prevent unjust
enrichment should be reexamined and perhaps narrowed." Further, he proposed that when one spouse transfers property to the other during marriage,
1
the presumption that the transfer was a gift should not be strictly applied.
Justice Harshbarger, in a separate concurring opinion, also disagreed
that fault should be a factor in equitable distribution for homemaking services.'

III. DEVELOPMENT
The Early Period-EquitableDistributionin Special Circumstances

A.

Until the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals decided LaRue, West
Virginia was the only common law state without a statute or judicial decision
allowing some form of equitable distribution.' Jurisdictions permitting such
4
distribution do not follow a uniform pattern. Most have enacted statutes,

Id
Id.
" Id.
1, Id.
, Id
Id
"
"

21

at
at
at
at
at
at

323-24.
324-25.
328-29 (Neely, J., concurring).
330-32.
332-34.
334-35.

Id at 335-36.

Id at 336 (Harshbarger, J., concurring).
9 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 1133 (Jan. 28, 1983). A bill to permit equitable distribution, containing a list of factors to be considered, failed to pass in the 1983 session of the West Virginia
Legislature. A similar bill is being considered in the 1984 session.
1 Only Florida, Mississippi, South Carolina and West Virginia have established some form of
equitable distribution through judicial decisions. All four allow distribution for homemaking services. See Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980); Landay v. Landay, 9 FAM. L. REP.
(BNA) 2401 (May 3, 1983); Reeves v. Reeves, 410 So. 2d 1300 (Miss. 1982) (lump-sum awarded from
husband's estate to compensate wife for economic contributions, but homemaker services also
'
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with some giving courts broad discretion without listing criteria." Others
have outlined detailed criteria, such as the length of the marriage, the age,
physical and emotional health of the parties, their occupations, income,
assets, skills, employability, liabilities and needs, and the extent of their
homemaking and economic contributions to the marriage.26
Statutes vary considerably with respect to what constitutes distributable
property. Some states only divide property acquired during the marriage and
exempt gifts or inheritances (and property exchanged therefore).' Others
have variations of these exemptions combined with additional extensions and
limitations. 8 Several states allow distribution of property regardless of how
or when the property had been acquired.'
While most states allow the courts to determine the amount of distribution, a few states allow equal division unless the courts find that this division
is inequitable." Furthermore, some states provide that marital property is
commonly owned once a divorce action is initiated." Considerable difference
exists, however, among the states in the consideration of marital misconduct
2
in equitable distribution. In certain states, fault is irrelevant, while in
others it is to be a factor within the court's discretion. Some statutes are
silent on the subject.'

recognized); Parrott v. Parrott, 292 S.E.2d 182 (S.C. 1982). Eight states are community property jurisdictions and all the other states and the District of Columbia have statutes for equitable
distribution.
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West Supp. 1983-1984).
See, e.g., N.Y. [DOm. REL.] LAW § 236 B (McKinney Supp. 1982-83). For a discussion contrasting the fixed-rule approach with the discretionary approach, see Note, Equitable Distribution vs. Fixed Rules: MaritalPropertyReform and the Uniform MaritalPropertyAct, 23 B.C.L.
REV. 761 (1982).
" See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 503 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-84).
23 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1513 (1981) (Marital property includes inheritances and
gifts from third parties during the marriage); MD. [CTS. & JUD. PROa.] CODE ANN. § 3-6A-05 (1980
& Supp. 1982) (courts shall determine which property is marital property).
" See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-81 (West Supp. 1983-84) (court may assign to either
the husband or wife all or any part of the estate of the other). But cf. IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.21.2
(West 1981 & Supp. 1983-84) (gifts and inheritances subject to property division but only if it
would be inequitable to other party or children not to divide it).
" See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214 (Supp. 1983) (All marital property shall be distributed
one-half to each party unless the court finds such a division to be inequitable. In that event, the
statute lists criteria for consideration).
31 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.58 (West Supp. 1983) (It is conclusively presumed that
each spouse made a substantial contribution to the acquisition of income and property); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 50-20(k) (Supp. 1981) ("The rights of the parties to an equitable distribution of marital
property are a species of common ownership, the rights of the respective parties vesting at the
time of the filing of the divorce action."). Id.
2See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-4-44 (1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-113(1) (1973 &
Supp. 1982).
"See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-81 (West Supp. 1983-84). See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN.
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In 1869, the Married Women's Property Acts were enacted in West
Virginia, placing the husband and wife on equal terms with respect to acquiring and owning property. Since then, many attempts had been made to persuade the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals to interpret each revision
of the West Virginia divorce code to be a legislative recognition of the
chancery courts' authority to decree an equitable distribution of marital
property.
The 1906 version of section 11, chapter 64 of the West Virginia Code
read, "upon decreeing a divorce ... the court may make such further decree
as it shall deem expedient, concerning the estate and maintenance of the parties, or either of them ... ." While the language seemed broad enough to
countenance the equitable distribution of marital property, the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals adopted a very narrow interpretation in Reynolds
v. Reynolds.3 4 There the court said,
The words "concerning the estate" of the parties, are evidently meant to give
the court authority to protect each party in the possession and enjoyment of
his or her respective estate, subject to such alimony as may be decreed, and
not to authorize the transfer of the legal title to the land by way of alimony.'
The court did, however, authorize a lien on the husband's property to secure
the wife's alimony.36
A dozen years later the court, in Tuning v. Tuning,- demonstrated more
flexibility and allowed a lump-sum monetary award as alimony, saying that
alimony was intended to compensate the inequity to the wife who had some
property interest in the marital estate. This holding represented a notable
departure from the traditional notion of alimony as merely the fulfillment of
the husband's obligation to support the wife, 'and it was a major step toward
recognizing that divorce courts have wide equitable powers to rectify the incongruities of property distribution upon divorce. Then under the 1923 Code,
the court, in Philips v. Philips,8 authorized the transfer of property from one
spouse to the other. In both Tuning and Philips, the court realized that there
were exceptional circumstances which justified some limited distribution of
property to prevent glaring inequities. 9
§ 31-1-11.5-11 (Burns 1980) (only financial misconduct is a factor);

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §
722A (1964). For a brief survey of equitable distribution laws among the states, see Freed,
Equitable Distributionas of December 1982, 9 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 4001 (Jan. 11, 1983).
m 68 W. Va. 15, 69 S.E. 381 (1910). Reversed lower court which allowed wife to have house
and lot conveyed to her as permanent alimony.
68 W. Va. at 24, 69 S.E. at 385.
68 W. Va. at 25, 69 S.E. at 385. Such an authorization has been maintained to the present.
90 W. Va. 457, 111 S.E. 139 (1922).
106 W. Va. 105, 144 S.E. 875 (1928).
In Tuning, the wife was the major economic contributor to the household and the husband
had refused to provide any support. In Philips,the wife who received alimony and who also held
valuable real estate was ordered to convey, to her husband, her half interest in another lot.
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To insure that the Code was not a blanket authority to distribute marital
assets, in 1930 the court, in Burdette v. Burdette," rejected a wife's contention that after twenty-five years of marriage she was entitled to half of the
marital property. The court specifically noted the special circumstances present in Tuning and Philips, which justified some sharing of the property,
were not found in Burdette.4'
B.

The Misinterpreted 1931 Code Led to 40 Years of Unwarranted
Backsliding

In 1931, section 11, chapter 64 of the 1923 Code was revised and
recodified as West Virginia Code sections 48-2-15 and 48-2-19 (1931). Shortly
after the revisions, the court reaffirmed that realty may not generally be
taken from the husband and vested in the wife as alimony, but clarified the
rule that property may be impressed to secure alimony payment.42
West Virginia Code section 48-2-15 (1931) was interpreted to be more
restrictive than its predecessors. In Selvy v. Selvy,43 the court noted that this
revised section indicated there was no longer the statutory authority over
the parties' estates except indirectly as a way to enforce the court's other
statutorily-based decrees regarding alimony, maintenance and child
custody." While the 1923 Code gave courts limited but direct statutory control over divorcing parties' property, West Virginia Code section 48-2-15
(1931) removed the direct statutory authority and left the courts only indirect
control limited to enforcing its other decrees. However, in 1931, a new section, West Virginia Code section 48-2-19 (1931), was added, keeping the door
open for any justifiable equitable remedy not otherwise permitted under
,0 109 W. Va. 95, 153 S.E. 150 (1930).
1, 109 W. Va. at 98-99, 153 S.E. at 151.
42 Games v. Games, 111 W. Va. 327, 161 S.E. 560 (1931).
'3 115 W. Va. 338, 177 S.E. 437 (1934).
" The relevant portion of W. VA. CODE, section 11, chapter 64 (1923), read:
Upon decreeing the dissolution of a marriage, and also upon decreeing a divorce,...the
court may make such further decree as it shall deem expedient, concerning the [estate
and] maintenance of the parties, or either of them, and the care, custody and maintenance of the minor children, and may determine with which of the parents the children,
or any of them may remain.... [brackets added].
In the 1931 Code, this section was recodified as W. VA. CODE § 48-2-15 and the bracketed words,
"estate and," were omitted, seeming to indicate a legislative intent to restrict the courts' authority to force property transfers. Furthermore, W. VA. CODE § 48-2-15 (1931) went on to say, in pertinent part:
For the purpose of making effectual any order or decree providedfor in this section the
court may make any order or decree concerning the estate of the parties, or either of
them, as it shall deem expedient. (Emphasis added.)
The emphasized phrase was noted by the court, in Selvy, as the indication that this section limited

the courts' power over the estate only to enforcing other authorized decrees. However, the
authority to distribute property was moved to a separate section, W. VA. CODE § 48-2-19 (1931).
See infra note 45.
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other code sections.45 Indeed, the court in Selvy was careful to note that this
general equity power still existed but failed to recognize it existed by virtue
of section 48-2-19.
[T]o confer the right in a divorce case to control the estate of the parties other
than in aid of a decree for alimony, the bill of complaint must contain
averments that would rest such jurisdiction, not upon the divorce statute, but
on the general equity jurisdiction of the court."
The court in LaRue suggested that the Selvy court's failure to consider
the provisions of section 48-2-19 and the accompanying reviser's notes on the
purpose of the statute created an unwarranted restriction on the divorce
law. 7
Since Selvy, and for the next forty years, this "unwarranted restriction"
remained the law. Upon divorce, a spouse was generally entitled to retain
any property in his or her name at the time of divorce, subject only to the
courts' general equity powers. 8 In the meantime, other jurisdictions began to
revise their statutes to allow equitable distribution of marital property. 9 In
West Virginia, the thrust of remedial efforts to avoid the inequities encountered by divorced women came by way of an expanded alimony authority. Curiously, progress in this regard came primarily after the 1969 Code
revisions to section 48-2-15 which, for the first time, allowed a husband to
receive alimony from his wife."
4 W. VA. CODE § 48-2-19 (1931) read:
Upon decreeing the annulment of a marriage, or upon decreeing a divorce,... the court
shall have power to award to either of the parties whatever of his or her property, real
or personal, may be in the possession, or under the control, or in the name, of the other,
and to compel a transfer or conveyance thereof as in other cases of chancery.
This statute has remained unchanged since 1931 but has been recodified as W. VA. CODE § 48-2-21
(1980).
115 W. Va. at 343, 177 S.E. at 439.
,T304 S.E.2d at 319 n.10 (W. Va. 1983). The reviser's notes to this section read, "As there is
omitted from § 15 the provision giving the court power to decree 'concerning the estate of the parties, or either of them'.. it is deemed advisable to add this section here."
" See Patterson v. Patterson, 277 S.E.2d 709 (W. Va. 1981) (fashioned a constructive trust
theory); Collins v. Muntzing, 151 W. Va. 843, 157 S.E.2d 16 (1967) (court found no authority to
order sale of property and order proceeds be divided between husband and wife, even if both parties consent); State ex rel. Hammond v. Worrell, 144 W. Va. 83, 106 S.E.2d 521 (1958) (court has no
jurisdiction to decree a partitioning of real estate owned jointly, even with both parties' consent);
Wilcoxon v. Carrier, 132 W. Va. 637, 53 S.E.2d 620 (1949) (in absence of a special agreement, wife
not entitled to earnings in household or in husband's business); Wood v. Wood, 126 W. Va. 189, 28
S.E.2d 423 (1943) (wife's labor is quid pro quo for maintenance; no right to husband's property).
, By 1982, forty-three states and the District of Columbia had provisions for equitable distribution. See Note, Equitable Distributionvs. Fixed Rules: MaritalProperty Reform and the
Uniform MaritalPropertyAct 23 B.C.L. REv. 761, 762 (1982); See also Freed, EquitableDistribution as of December, 1982, 9 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 4001 (1983).
5' West Virginia also enacted a no-fault divorce law in 1969. W. VA. CODE §§ 48-2-4(a)(7) and
48-2-4(a)(10) (1980 & Supp. 1983).
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C. The PartnershipConcept of Marriage Expands Alimony Powers
A major conceptual change in the marriage relationship spawned the
liberalization of alimony awards and later gave rise to the current right to
claim equitable distribution. Marriage has come to be recognized as having
some aspects of an economic partnership wherein both spouses are recognized as possessing some joint interest in the property acquired during marriage. Traditionally alimony had been considered a punitive and continuing
obligation of the husband to support his wife and not as a mechanism for compensating the wife for her contributions to the marriage.-' But in Corbin v.
Corbin," the court considered, in granting alimony, the sacrifices the wife
had made toward the marriage. The court said,
A trial court is entitled to take into consideration in awarding alimony both
the age and family obligations of a woman as well as the degree to which she
has relied to her detriment in choosing to be a housewife and mother rather
than to pursue her own independent career.'
The partnership concept of marriage and the compensatory nature of alimony
was later upheld in Dyer v. Tsapis.4 The court suggested that the legislative
no-fault grounds for divorce implies that marriage takes on a contractual
nature and therefore, as in contractual matters, the court has power to grant
alimony as restitution. 5
Other modifications in the alimony rules included allowing circuit courts
to order certain blameless spouses to pay alimony, 8 and, in F. C. v. I V. C., the
court went so far as to say that instead of fault, "financial realities of the parties must be a court's primary inquiry in any alimony award."'1 This
represents a vast departure from the traditional concept of alimony as an
obligation and punishment. 8
Despite this broadening of alimony powers to prevent unjust enrichment,
alimony-based remedies fell short of providing equitable relief in many
divorces. The fact that alimony may be terminated upon remarriage" or upon
See 304 S.E.2d at 322.
S.E.2d 898 (W. Va. 1974).
1 Id. at 903-04.
249 S.E.2d 509 (W. Va. 1978).
Id. at 512-13. See, e.g., Haynes v. Haynes, 264 S.E.2d 474 (W. Va. 1980).
' As a general rule, blameless parties are not charged with alimony. Dyer v. Tsapis, 249
S.E.2d at 513. But see F.C. v. I.V.C., 300 S.E.2d 99 (W. Va. 1982) (alimony awarded based on need);
Haynes v. Haynes, 264 S.E.2d 474 (W. Va. 1980) (alimony awarded in divorce for irreconcilable differences); Dyer v. Tsapis, 249 S.E.2d 509 (W. Va. 1978) (in a voluntary separation divorce, alimony
allowed for "inequitable conduct"); Beard v. Worrell, 212 S.E.2d 598 (W. Va. 1974) (faultless spouse
seeking divorce because of husband's incurable insanity may be required to pay alimony).
'3 300 S.E.2d 99, 101 (W. Va. 1982).
"See W. MORRIS,LAW OF DOESTIC RELATIONS IN WEST VIRGINIA § 11-2 at 23 (1982 Supp.).
"Id. at § 11-9 at 149 (1973).
"1

52 206
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the payor's death" illustrates this inadequacy. If one includes the fact that
alimony may be forfeited by a spouse who is at fault in the divorce, and then
adds the difficulty of enforcing payment, it is clear that one spouse may unjustly lose all that he or she had labored for during the marriage.
Another remedial step in the equitable partnership idea came in Murredu
v. Murredu.6 There, the court affirmed the circuit court's decree that awarded the husband custody of the children and exclusive 'use of the jointly-held
home and furnishings as an incident to child custody, until the youngest child
reached the age of eighteen. This arrangement can arguably be considered an
order for alimony payment in a form other than payment of cash, and not a
decree for equitable distribution.2
D.

The Final Wave-Constructive Trusts and Equitable Distribution

The final wave of progress began in 1981 with the case of Patterson v.
Patterson." There the court fashioned a constructive trust theory Which
enabled a spouse to claim an interest in marital property titled in the other
spouse if the claiming party had made a measurable economic contribution
toward that property. The purpose of the constructive trust was to redress
unjust enrichment resulting from equitable wrong;64 it operated to impress a
trust upon the prbperty for the benefit of the untitled spouse. 5 Such a trust
could be established regardless of the fault of the parties and was not subject
to the same shortcomings and terminability as alimony.
Pattersonwas the final stepping stone to the court's decision in LaRue.
Its greatest limitations were that a constructive trust could not be impressed
merely on the basis of homemaking services, and it did not recognize the
authority to transfer real property to the deserving spouse in lieu of or as a
supplement to alimony. 7 The court, in LaRue, finally removed those limitations but left in its wake still other problems, such as the difficulty in determining marital assets and the inequity present when the wife is at fault and
her only economic contributions are homemaking services.

IV. ANALYSIS
The line of cases culminating with LaRue shows a rather obstinate pro-

"
02

In re Estate of Hereford, 250 S.E.2d 45 (W. Va. 1978).
236 S.E.2d 452 (W. Va. 1977).

See W. MORRIS, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN WEST VIRGINIA § 11-11 at 27 (1982 Supp.).

See also Sandusky v. Sandusky, 271 S.E.2d 434 (W. Va. 1981) (allowed exclusive use and possession of marital home as an incident of alimony, custody and maintenance of the child); McKinney v.
Kingdon, 251 S.E.2d 216 (W. Va. 1978) (allowed equitable distribution of separately owned car).
277 S.E.2d 709 (W. Va. 1981).
Id. at 716.
See 5 A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 404.2 (1967 & Supp. 1983).
Patterson v. Patterson, 277 S.E.2d 709, 712 (W. Va. 1981).
Id. at 716.
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gression through an area of law which has been scrupulously guarded on one
flank, by the seemingly immutable belief in the inviolability of title, and
ferverently fortified, on the other, by allies from church and state who hold
traditions of matrimony to be sacrosanct. Although lagging behind the thrust
in other jurisdictions," the development of property rights after divorce in
West Virginia cannot be characterized as perverse. The economic plight of
divorced women is not fully eradicated by the LaRue decision, but the potential for easing the plight is finally at hand.
A number of issues arise now that equitable distribution is possible in
West Virgina: 1) What asssets will be considered as marital property? 2) To
what extent should fault be taken into consideration when distributing
marital assets claimed as compensation for homemaking services? and 3) Will
the LaRue decision affect future alimony awards? Overlying these issues is
perhaps the more intriguing question of whether circuit courts will use their
equitable authority in such a way as to actually decree fair distribution of
marital property.
A.

Applying the Formulafor Determining MaritalAssets

While the LaRue decision seems to acknowledge that marriage is a kind
of economic partnership," it by no means establishes equal rights to marital
property such as those enjoyed by those in community property jurisdictions.
In fact, the established right was only a claim to a fair share in the property
acquired during marriage. Whether one actually is awarded any share of the
property is entirely within the court's discretion. Even when the court finds
cause to transfer property from one spouse to the other, there is never a
guarantee that the spouses will get their fair share.
According to LaRue, the court is to consider the respective economic contributions made by both parties during the marriage as weighed against the
net assets that are available at the time of divorce. "Net assets" do not include assets acquired before marriage or assets acquired during the marriage
by way of inheritance or gift from a third party. Furthermore, the indebtedness owed against such assets should ordinarily be deducted from its fair
market value."0 The courts may also consider the value of gifts made from one
spouse to the other in calculating the amount of equitable distribution. 1
Whether or not there is a fair distribution of assets will depend largely
upon what assets are determined to be marital property. For even an
See Freed, supra note 49.
304 S.E.2d at 319-20.
Id. at 321.
71 Id Thus, where a husband purchases a home with his own assets and places legal title in
both his and wife's names, or in the wife's name alone, it would be permissible for the court, after
determining the amount of equitable distribution due the wife, to consider, as an offset, the initial
value of the wife's share of the home. Id at 321 n.14.
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equitable distribution may often seem unfair because the court refused to
consider a substantial portion of one spouse's wealth to be part of the
distributable assets. Three very typical and sizeable assets which can be excluded from the marital property are premarital assets, inheritances, and individual gifts from a third party to a spouse.72
1. Premarital Assets
Among the many characteristics of the marriage relationship is the concept of sharing. In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, the spouses
generally assume that they will share their wealth together, however and
whenever accumulated, and that they will remain married forever. However,
the court, in LaRue, specifically exempts distribution of assets held by one
spouse before the marriage. 7 Thus, when a woman marries a wealthy individual and, for obvious reasons, feels it unnecessary to make any further
contributions to the marital estate, the wife has no right to share in the husband's premarital assets upon divorce. Her frugality during the marriage to
preserve the premarital wealth, cannot be rewarded after divorce from the
husband's premarital assets. Her reward for her thrift would be limited only
to those assets acquired during the marriage, including any interest earned
on the premarital assets, and limited further to a claim based on homemaking
services which would be subject to reduction for fault. In such a marriage,
the wife, feeling financially secure, may have foregone opportunities to earn
assets independently. Such a decision may, years later, have unfortunate consequences at the time of the divorce. But, depending upon the grounds for
divorce, the wife may, nevertheless, get a satisfactory distribution for homemaking services and generous alimony as a result of the broadened equitable
powers of the court. Again, much will depend upon the extent to which the
circuit courts exercise their equitable powers.
2. Individually Acquired Inheritances and Third Party Gifts
Inheritances and gifts from third parties received by one spouse during
marriage are also exempt from equitable distribution upon divorce. Here
again, too much reliance on the other spouse's inheritances and gifts can lead
to a disasterous loss of expectancy upon divorce. Quite often, couples use
these unearned assets to create a retirement fund for their mutual security.
Despite the spouses' intentions, such a nest egg, upon divorce, reverts to the
one who individually acquired the property. One might argue that the retirement fund, even if deposited in a joint account, represented a gift from one
spouse to the other and therefore, the donee is entitled to his or her share of
304 S.E.2d at 321.

SId.
74 Id.
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the fund. However equitable that may seem, there is no assurance that the
courts will comply with this reasoning. In fact, LaRue permits circuit courts
to consider such gifts to be an offset against any distribution award to which
the donee spouse may otherwise be entitled.75
3.

Future Interests

Retirement plans, Social Security benefits and insurance policies present
peculiar problems in equitable distribution. While the majority opinion failed
to consider whether such future interests are part of the marital property,
Justice Neely, in his concurring opinion, suggests such future interests would
"seem to be... ripe for redistribution under a court's equitable powers. ' 7
In most states, pensions are considered marital property,77 but a number
of state courts have held that if the pension rights are contingent or subject
to divestment, they are not subject to equitable distribution; similarly, pension plans which are non-contributory or with unascertainable cash values
are also exempt.78 Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has decided to exclude military and railroad retirement benefits from distribution
because those are personal entitlements.79
The difficulty lies in trying to determine the present value of such retirement rights. Even if there is a determinable value, company plans often cannot be terminated before retirement except upon death or termination of
employment. Justice Neely suggests that courts should, where appropriate,
preserve the retirement plan and allow the parties to share in future benefits
when they fully mature."0 This may be a sensible exception to the axiom, "a
bird in the hand is worth two in the bush." However, such a solution may
prove problematic if the retirement plan beneficiary quits his or her job, thus
cutting off the expected benefits. A divorced wife, for instance, would have
no control over her former husband's decision to leave the job and its potential benefits.
Life insurance policies provide their own set of problems. Whole life
policies generally have negligible cash surrender values and are far more
valuable to the beneficiary if not disturbed. But to keep a policy in effect, the
11Id. at 321 n.14. Justice Neely, in his concurring opinion, suggests the presumption of gift
between husband and wife should not be held too vigorously. Id. at 335 (Neely, J., concurring).
11304 S.E.2d at 331 (Neely, J., concurring).
7 Id
"' See, e.g., Witcig v. Witeig, 206 Neb. 307, 292 N.W.2d 788 (1980); Delay v. Delay, 612 S.W.2d

391 (Mo. App. 1981); Mueller v. Mueller, 166 N.J. Super. 557, 400 A.2d 136 (1979).
11McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981) (military retirement); Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo,

439 U.S. 572 (1979) (railroad retirement). However, Congress specifically addressed the question of
military pensions in the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 97-252,

96 Stat. 730 (1982) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1408). The Act, in effect, negates McCarty.
11304 S.E.2d at 332 (Neely, J., concurring).
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court would have to order the policy holder to keep it intact, thereby
creating difficult enforcement problems. Courts will need to search for
creative ways to distribute future interests in life insurance policies without
destroying the policy's value to both parties.
B.

The Fault Factor-IsHomemaking Service an Economic Contribution?

The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has rightly recognized the
fact that in many marriages, both spouses contribute their individually acquired assets to the marital property. In such cases, the court has decided
that an equitable distribution of the marital property is in order under the
authority of section 48-2-21, regardless of fault in the divorce. The court considered such economic contributions as giving rise to a property interest.
However, in a great many marriages, the wife's only contribution to the
marital estate is that ,of providing homemaking and child-raising services. In
these cases, the circuit courts may deny the wife a share of the marital estate
where the divorce is her fault."1 Although this denial appears inconsistent
with the court's assessment of marriage as having aspects of an economic
partnership, the court distinguishes homemaking services from all other
economic contributions because, traditionally, homemaking services were the
quid pro quo for the husband's financial support. 2 Thus, having received such
support during marriage, the wife generally should not be entitled to claim
her services as grounds for further compensation.
The court's reasoning in this regard is logically inconsistent. There are
two contrasting analytical models at work here which the court has inadequately commingled. One model can be characterized as the Joint Enterprise
Model, wherein one can conceptualize the economic aspect of the marriage as
a joint account into which the spouses contribute all their marital assets including homemaking services and earnings. Upon divorce, the spouses would
receive their proportionate or equitable share of the joint account, including
a proportionate share for their homemaking services, regardless of their
marital misconduct. This is based on, and consistent with, the court's recognition of the partnership concept of marriage. The other analytical model can
be characterized as the Mixed-Contractual Model, wherein one can conceptualize a two-tiered relationship including a joint account of marital economic
contributions coupled with the traditional concept of homemaking services as
the consideration for financial support of the marriage. Under this model if
both spouses contributed financially, the joint account would be equitably
distributed but the "contractual" relationship would be addressed under the
existing alimony laws, thereby necessarily excluding homemaking services
from the equitable distribution scheme. Under this model, a spouse's marital

81 Id. at 321-22.

Id. at 322.
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misconduct would be considered only in regard to the contractual aspects in
accordance with alimony laws, but would not interfere with any recoupment
for having made financial contributions.
The court, although not having recognized these models as such, has, in
its efforts to reconcile the inequities inherent in the existing state of the
divorce law, adopted a hybrid of these two models which is analytically incongruent. The court allows equitable distribution for homemaking services
as if adopting the Joint Enterprise Model, but maintains its adherence to the
traditional "contractual" notion of homemaking services as if adopting the
Mixed-Contractual Model. To confound matters further, the court interjects
the fault standard only with regard to equitable distribution claims based
solely on homemaking services.
If, conceptually, the spouses exchange homemaking services for financial
support, then that contractual relationship is distinct from any property interests vested by virtue of economic contributions made to the marital estate
(or, more precisely, the marital surplus). But the court failed to recognize this
distinction and implies that homemaking services can be conceptualized as
both a quid pro quo and a contribution to the marital surplus. This construct
would seem to suggest that a faultless homemaker who made no economic
contributions to the estate could, conceivably, receive alimony for her husband's breach of marital duty and a share of the marital surplus; perhaps an
intended result. Conversely though, if the homemaking spouse is at fault,
that fault can be used as a double-edged sword, cutting out her alimony and
share of the marital surplus. Therein lies the inconsistency. For, if homemaking services can be conceptualized as giving rise to a claim in the marital
surplus, such a claim should remain vested and not be affected by the
spouse's misconduct. The inconsistency is a function of conceptualizing homemaking services as being both a marital/contractual duty and a contribution
to the marital estate.
Had the court recognized and adopted the Joint Enterprise Model, fault
would not be a consideration in claims based solely on homemaking services;
and had it adopted the Mixed-Contractual Model, fault could be considered in
claims based solely on homemaking services because the alimony laws, which
would govern such cases, provide the remedy for such a breach. But it was
this latter result which the court was trying to avoid. The existing alimony
laws were insufficient to remedy the inequities of homemaker cases like
LaRue. So, clearly, the intent of LaRue was to circumvent the inadequate
alimony laws to expand the rights of homemakers. Accordingly, the MixedContractual Model is inadequate and, therefore, implicitly rejected.
In order for the court to adopt the Joint Enterprise Model, it would have
to reject the notion that homemaking services are the consideration for the
other spouse's financial support. The simplicity of the Joint Enterprise
Model, coupled with the court's awareness of marriage as a partnership,
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tends to suggest that the Joint Enterprise Model is more appropriate and
equitable.
In addition to misconstruing the role of homemaking services, the court
also fails to consider one very essential factor. The value of a wife's
homemaking services may, and often does, exceed the value of the husband's
financial support. One estimate values homemaking services at approximately $40,000.00 per year.3 Where this is the case and where the wife is at fault,
a court may, nonetheless, deny the wife a share of her excess contribution.
As Justice Neely points out in his concurring opinion, this incorrectly blurs
the distinction between the right to alimony, which is based on the duty to
support the other spouse, and restoration of property under section 48-2-21,
which is based on a concept of unjust enrichment."
The right to recover from the marital surplus the proportionate share of
Because the statute
one's contribution is a limited but unqualified right ....
mandates restoration, a spouse's right to recover his or her share should not
be qualified by considerations of fault in the break-up of the marriage, relative
wealth, needs of the children or any other matter. 5
If fault is placed on the wife, her penalty ought to be extracted from the
alimony award. Alimony is, and has been by tradition, the mechanism by
which a blameless party is compensated for the loss of expect future
support." The alimony laws in West Virginia are sufficiently flexible to make
the proper adjustment for any fault involved." It is unnecessary to complicate alimony principles with those of property interests.
The obvious major impediment to associating homemaking services with
property rights is the difficulty in determining the relative valud of the
homemaking services vis-a-vis the husband's financial support during marriage. Some additional consideration would have to be given to the husband's
homemaking contributions. Clearly these factors would be difficult to
substantiate and would add further burdens to all parties concerned, including the court, to a procedure already heavily laden with emotional and
painstaking evidentiary matters.
While the potential exists for unfair distribution of marital assets, the
new law, as expressed in LaRue, creates far greater potential for fairer
distribution of assets than existed in the past. Any subsequent development
in this area will depend upon how the circuit courts exercise this new

Foster, Commentary on Equitable Distribution,26 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 1, 42 (1981).
304 S.E.2d at 332-34 (Neely, J., concurring).
Id- at 333 (Neely, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
See Burdette v. Burdette, 109 W. Va. 95, 153 S.E. 150 (1930), affd 110 W. Va. 646, 159 S.E.
833 (1931).
" See supra text accompanying notes 52-62.
'
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authority. Should the courts cling too rigidly to the old property and status
notions of marriage' and allow fault to interfere too often and too much in
the distribution of marital assets, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals will have to reexamine the distinction between alimony and restoration
and clarify whether homemaking services fall within the realm of property
interests or within the quasi-contractual realm of alimony. 9
V.

CONCLUSION

By virtue of a fresh interpretation of West Virginia Code sections 48-2-15
and 48-2-21, West Virginia circuit courts now have at their disposal the
authority to equitably settle financial claims in divorce actions. While the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, in LaRue, did not guarantee any
right to be compensated for contributions to the marital estate, it did give
courts more flexibility to award equitable distribution where such a claim is
made. In addition to granting alimony awards, the circuit courts may transfer
property from one spouse to the other and award lump sums of money as
restitution even for homemaking services.
Equitable distribution will not completely eradicate the economic injustice suffered by divorced women, but the potential now exists for restoring to the divorced wife her fair share of her contribution to the marital
assets. Whether the principles espoused in LaRue will be shared with equal
ardor among the circuit courts remains to be seen. The distribution formula
is sufficiently flexible to promote equity, but equally flexible to permit less
desirable results.
Claimants wishing to make the best of the situation will need to submit
rather detailed accounts of the net assets of the marriage, their individual
economic and homemaking contributions, the nature and purpose of any interspousal gifts, the disposition of any inheritance or gifts received from
third parties, and the disposition of any assets held before the marriage. All
of this adds substantially to the pleading burden and puts the spouse who,
throughout the marriage maintained records and accounts, at a decided advantage.
Since the court has not altered the law with respect to its liberal alimony
authority, the spouse at fault for the divorce may lose a considerable share of
I See Note, The Distributionof MaritalReal Property Upon Divorce in West Virginia: The
Need for Legislative Reform, 82 W. VA. L. REV. 611, 613-14 (1980).
" See The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act § 307(a) (1970)(amend. 1971, 1973)(Alternative
A) 9A U.L.A. 142 (1979). "[T]he court, without regard to marital misconduct, shall,... equitably apportion between the parties the property and assets belonging to either or both however and
whenever acquired, and whether the title thereto is in the name of the husband or wife or both."
See also Note, Equitable Distributionvs. Fixed Rules: MaritalPropertyReform and the Uniform
Marital PropertyAct 23 B.C.L. REV. 761 (1982).
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past and future assets. He or she may be forced to give up the other spouse's
share of the marital assets regardless of title and may have to pay rather
substantial alimony as both compensation for sacrifices made by the other
spouse during marriage" and as the fulfillment of the marital support obligation.
As the trend in West Virginia seems clearly to advance toward recognizing marriage as having aspects of an economic partnership, we should see
significant improvement in the settlement of marital assets in future divorce
actions.
Gerald Allan Kinchy

11See, e.g., Corbin v. Corbin, 206 S.E.2d 898, 903-04 (W. Va. 1974). See also supra text accompanying note 53.
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